The Evolution of the Turkistan Islamic Party
The Review Series | June 2025
In the latest episode of The Review Series, Intel Focus co-hosts Qais Alamdar and Rajab Taieb unpacked a development that has gone largely unnoticed in mainstream coverage: the apparent disbanding of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria, and its fighters’ integration into the country’s newly restructured army.
Once known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the TIP is a militant organisation rooted in Uyghur separatism. It emerged in the late 1990s in response to Chinese repression in Xinjiang, aiming to establish an independent East Turkestan. The group was formed around a mixture of ethnic and religious identity, drawing on Turkic nationalism and jihadist ideology.
After initial refuge and training in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the group formed links with al-Qaeda, with leadership eventually passing to Abdul Haq al-Turkistani. In 2008, TIP drew global attention after issuing threats against the Beijing Olympics, and was designated a terrorist organisation by the UN, US, and others.
As Rajab explained, TIP’s influence inside China became impossible, pushing the group outward. The Syrian civil war became a new battleground. From around 2012, TIP fighters—along with their families—settled in Idlib, aligning with Jabhat al-Nusra and later Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Their involvement in Syria wasn’t symbolic: they were reportedly among the most dedicated frontline units, even part of suicide squads.
But things changed with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024. As the new Syrian leadership began forming a post-war army, it opted not to expel foreign fighters like TIP. Instead, it proposed their integration, forming the 84th Division, a decision made to prevent these fighters from joining other jihadist groups like ISIS. The US, after initial resistance, ultimately accepted this approach, citing lessons from post-2003 Iraq, where dismantling the military created fertile ground for insurgencies.
According to Ahmad al-Sharaa’s administration, the TIP fighters—numbering around 3,500—will be granted Syrian citizenship and are being fully absorbed into national structures. Rajab noted that their loyalty, residence in Syria with families, and battlefield discipline made them more manageable than stateless, roaming militants.
Still, questions linger. Has the TIP truly ended, or just morphed into something else? As Qais pointed out, while the Syrian branch has dissolved, TIP’s roots in Afghanistan, Waziristan, and Pakistan may continue to operate quietly. Groups like this rarely disappear entirely—they adapt, rebrand, or shift strategy.
For China, TIP’s formal integration into a state-backed army will be hard to accept. Beijing still views the group as a terrorist threat. With the US warming relations with Syria’s new leadership, and TIP’s former leader Ahmad al-Sharaa possibly attending the UN General Assembly, a complex new geopolitical chapter is emerging.
The case of TIP reflects how militant movements evolve—not always with a bang, but through quiet deals, regional calculations, and global realignments.
